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Notes
The Textiles Monitoring Body: Can It
Bring Textile Trade into GATT?
K. Kristine Dunn*
While many scholars regard the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations1 as enormously significant, several
analysts have doubted both the legal and practical significance
of the new rules and agreements of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 These skeptics question whether
sufficient political will exists in developed countries to conform
to the new negotiated schedule for eliminating trade restric-
tions.3 In particular, after decades of special rules in the realm
of trade in textiles and apparel, the Uruguay Round secured
commitments by member countries to progressively integrate
this sector into the general GATT disciplines and multilateral
rules. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (the Agreement
or ATC)4 embodies these commitments. If effectively imple-
mented, this Agreement would reinstate the price mechanism as
the predominant guide in production and consumption decisions
and allow trade and investment in textiles and apparel to more
* The author would like to express her thanks to Robert E. Hudec for his
insightful comments on the topic.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol.
1 (1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see, e.g., Note, Develop-
ing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the Promise of De-
velopment, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1715, 1715 and n.5 (1995) (acknowledging this
skepticism and citing several articles discussing these doubts).
3. Geoff Raby, Introduction to THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READ-
INGS 13, 16 (Geoff Raby ed., 1994).
4. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A: Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts, 85 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994)
[hereinafter ATC].
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closely reflect the competitive advantages of each member coun-
try.5 Whether member countries in fact realize the liberalizing
objectives associated with this new Agreement remains to be
seen,6 but the potential economic impact of such integration is
substantial. It is estimated that one third of the total antici-
pated economic gain from trade liberalization under the Uru-
guay Round will result from the dismantling of the old rules
governing trade in textiles and clothing.7
To supervise the day-to-day implementation of this arrange-
ment and to adjudicate disputes arising between members in
conjunction with the ATC, the Agreement establishes a quasi-
judicial body, the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). The TMB,
however, has suffered harsh criticism from both exporting and
importing countries in its adjudicatory role. Following recent
losses in disputes before the TMB, representatives of the United
States' textile and apparel industries claim that the TMB is
rigged against them. In the same spirit, exporting countries al-
lege that the officials appointed by textile importing countries
are "shamefacedly biased" and are unable to do a credible job of
adjudicating disputes.8 Critics have asserted several additional
complaints with regard to the functioning of the TMB since the
Agreement became effective on January 1, 1995, including its
lack of transparency and its inability to reach consensus in
disputes. 9
This Note will identify and examine the criticisms directed
at the Textiles Monitoring Body. Part I briefly outlines the his-
tory of protectionism in textile and apparel trade. Part II in-
troduces the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the
Textiles Monitoring Body and its assigned duties under the
Agreement. Part III identifies the substantial protectionist
political pressures that exist in the United States, particularly
5. Maarten Smeets, Main Features of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, and Implications for the Trading System, 29 J. WORLD
TRADE 97, 97 (1995).
6. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the United States'
strategy for postponing any commercially meaningful integration of products
until the final stage of the ATC's liberalization program).
7. Raby, supra note 3, at 16.
8. Eduardo Lachica & Bhushan Bahree, Pakistan, Textile Exporters Ask
WTO Help in Dispute, AsiAN WALL ST. J., July 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL-
WSJA 10218501. At present, the European Union ranks as the world's largest
textiles importer, and the United States is the second largest. Frances Wil-
liams, Fruits of Textiles Pact Fail to Ripen: Poor Nations Have Yet to See Bene-
fits from Accord, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at 4.
9. See infra part IV.D. (discussing these criticisms).
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with respect to textile and apparel trade, and the corresponding
reluctance of these industries to relinquish the protectionism
they have enjoyed in recent decades. Part III further links these
pressures with the U.S. Administration's failure to live up to the
spirit of the new textiles Agreement. Part IV evaluates how the
TMB has functioned under this pressure, especially in the con-
text of recent disputes it has adjudicated and that were subse-
quently appealed to the World Trade Organization's Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). Part V initially argues that the TMB's
alleged lack of transparency and inability to reach consensus on
disputes are significant flaws in the functioning of this quasi-
judicial body and that member countries ought to address these
flaws. Finally, Part V contrasts the perceived role and review
power of the TMB with the role of WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (DSU) panels and offers some proposals for modify-
ing the review and dispute settlement process in this sector to
increase its efficiency.
I. HISTORY OF PROTECTIONISM IN THE TEXTILE AND
APPAREL INDUSTRIES
The U.S. textile and apparel industries employ approxi-
mately 1.6 million workers.' 0 Broadly speaking, both the textile
and apparel industries are fairly labor intensive. As a result,
developing countries with low average wages have a substantial
competitive advantage in these industries." The United States,
10. Lauren A. Murray, Unraveling Employment Trends in Textiles and Ap-
parel, 118 MONTHLY LAB REV. 62, 62 (1995) (detailing the trends in employment
and capital investment in the textile and apparel industries).
11. Janet Patricia Farmer, NAFTA and the Textile and Apparel Industries:
"Made in North America," 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 293, 297-98 (1994).
Less developed and developing countries have concentrated on textile and ap-
parel industries in particular because the necessary raw materials are rela-
tively common and the two industries require less capital than most
manufacturing activities. Murray, supra note 10, at 66. In fact, developing
countries now supply 90 percent of U.S. apparel imports. U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIES
OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, IV-14 (1994) [hereinafter USITC].
Textile and apparel imports comprised 7 percent of total U.S. imports during
1994. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TEXTILE TRADE: OPERATIONS OF THE
COMMITrEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXTILE AGREEMENTS 1, 1 (1996)
[hereinafter U.S. GAO]. One recent report documents the growth of these in-
dustries in less developed and developing countries; in the past twenty-five
years, the number of textile, clothing, and footwear workers in the United
States dropped 30 percent, while the number of such workers in Malaysia in-
creased nearly 600 percent. Pamela M. Prah, Shift in Textile, Garment Indus-
try Jobs Will Be Spotlighted During ILO Meeting, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA),
Oct. 28, 1996, at D2. From 1970 to 1990 the number of textile, clothing, and
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with average wages significantly higher than those in develop-
ing countries, regularly runs a trade deficit in these areas. 12
The textile industry encompasses the production of yarn and
thread and the production of fabrics from these materials; in re-
lation to the apparel industry, the textile industry is capital in-
tensive, incorporates high technology, and typically uses highly
skilled workers. 13 In contrast, the apparel industry consists of
the cutting and sewing of fabric into finished clothing products,
is relatively labor-intensive, and requires considerably less in-
frastructure than the textile industry.14
Since the early 1960s, policies governing trade in textiles
and apparel have departed from the fundamental principles of
GATT-most notably with regard to Article I's most favored na-
tion treatment and Article XI's prohibitions against quantitative
restrictions.' 5 After a series of Short-Term and Long-Term Ar-
rangements, 16 the Arrangement Regarding International Trade
footwear workers in Bangladesh increased 416 percent; in Sri Lanka the
number increased 385 percent; and in Indonesia, the number of such workers
increased 334 percent. Id. Due to significant capital investments in the textile
industry during the 1970s and 1980s and the slightly less labor intensive na-
ture of the textile industry relative to the apparel industry, the United States
textile industry has fared better than the United States apparel industry. Mur-
ray, supra note 10, at 64.
12. Farmer, supra note 11, at 298.
13. Id. at 297. ("Labor comprises more than thirty-one percent of total ap-
parel production costs as compared to twenty-two percent to twenty-five percent
for the textile industry.") Id.
14. Id. The United States International Trade Commission reported that
the United States is one of the world's largest and most efficient producers of
textile mill products due to its significant investment in new technology, re-
structuring, and coordination efforts. See USITC, supra note 11, at 27-28 (ex-
plaining that the greatest threat to the U.S. textile sector is the continued
increase in garment imports, since the domestic apparel industry is its single
largest market). It has been more difficult to mechanize the apparel sector.
William R. Cline, Textiles and Apparel, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY RouND: A
RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 63, 75 (Jef-
frey J. Schott, ed., 1990).
15. Jared L. Landaw, Textile and Apparel Trade Liberalization: The Need
for a Strategic Change in Free Trade Arguments, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 205,
206 (1989); see also GATT, supra note 2, arts. 1, 3, and 11. Landaw and several
other scholars assert that this special treatment results from the politically
powerful coalition of textile and apparel industries, unions, and associations.
Landaw, supra, at 218; see also Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, The Mul-
tifiber Arrangement: "Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 51, 86 (1987).
16. See generally Rebecca Reese, International Trade in Textiles and Ap-
parel: The Legal Regime, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS OUT 381, 383
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1994) (providing a detailed account of the agree-
ments preceding the ATC).
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in Textiles, commonly referred to as the Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment (MFA), was negotiated in 1973 and became effective on
January 1, 1974.17 Member nations designed the MFA as a
transitional arrangement to ease the structural adjustment in
the textiles and apparel industries of developed countries con-
fronting rapid shifts in comparative advantage towards develop-
ing countries.' 8 The MFA supplied a framework of rules and
procedures under which members could bilaterally negotiate
quota restrictions and voluntary restraint arrangements. 19
These special policies created a system in which countries gener-
ally negotiated import quotas bilaterally. Additionally, the MFA
authorized member nations to unilaterally impose quotas on a
selective basis by alleging that imports of a particular product
from a specific country were "disrupting" a member's domestic
market.20 Until this point, trade in textiles and apparel had ex-
isted within a complex system of bilateral agreements under the
general framework of the MFA, which constituted a comprehen-
sive violation of fundamental GATT principles.21
17. Landaw, supra note 15, at 210. Since 1974, the MFA has been renewed
on six occasions. Williams, supra note 8, at 4.
18. Richard Hughes, The Uruguay Round: New Approach for the Textiles
and Clothing Sector, INT'L TRADE FORUM, 4/1995, at 4. In fact, the MFA de-
tailed its objectives in the following manner:
"to achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such
trade and the progressive liberalization of world trade in textile prod-
ucts, while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable devel-
opment of this trade and avoidance of disruptive effects in individual
markets ... in both importing and exporting countries."
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, art. 1(2) [hereinafter MFA]. As for the United
States' domestic legal framework, the President established the Committee for
the Implementation of Textile Agreements [hereinafter CITA], pursuant to au-
thority contained in Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended, to
oversee execution of all textile trade agreements. David J. Weiler & Allyson L.
Senie, International Rules of the Textile and Apparel Trade Regime, in THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
505, 511-12 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1994). CITA is an interagency body,
chaired by the Department of Commerce. Id. at 512. The Department of Com-
merce monitors all agreements and supplies statistical data upon which CITA
actions are taken. Id. at 512-13. CITA has the authority to direct the Commis-
sioner of Customs to unilaterally impose quotas or impose quotas on imports
from countries with which the United States has a bilateral arrangement. Id. at
513.
19. See MFA, supra note 18, art. 3(3).
20. Xiaobing Tang, Textiles and the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 51, 53 (1989).
21. Protection accorded to the United States' textile and apparel industries
in recent decades has been characterized as the "Mt. Everest of protection." Tes-
timony, 102d Cong. (1994) (statement of Julia K. Hughes, Chair, U.S. Associa-
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II. ON THE ROAD TO LIBERALIZATION
A. THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
In the recent Uruguay Round, member nations negotiated
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which
effectively replaces the MFA. 22 Contracting parties designed
the ATC to provide for the progressive integration of textile and
apparel trade into GATT and its disciplines through two key
mechanisms: (1) eliminating quotas on selected products in four
stages over a ten year period, culminating in 2005; and (2) in-
creasing quota growth rates on remaining products at each of
the first three stages. 23 The schedule for integration of covered
products into GATT 1994 is structured as follows:
tion of Importers of Textiles and Apparel), available in 1994 WL 14167829
[hereinafter Singapore Hearing]. Addressing the implications of the protection-
ism in this sector, one importer representative complained that "[iut's harder to
import a pair of underwear than a gun." Amy I. Schatz, GAO Report Claims
U.S. Textile Agency Lacks Proof to Support Quota Demands, WALL ST. J., Nov.
6, 1996, at A10. A number of studies estimate the potential growth in textile
and apparel trade if tariffs in these sectors and MFA quotas were removed. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated that develop-
ing country apparel exports would increase by 135 percent and textile exports
by 78 percent. Smeets, supra note 5, at 107 (citing United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, Protectionism and Structural Adjustment (1986)).
Another study contends that exports to major Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries would increase 93 percent for clothing
and 82 percent for textiles. Smeets, supra note 5, at 107 (citing N. KiRMANI ET
AL., EFFECTS OF INCREASED MARKET ACCESS ON EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES (1984)). Yet another study suggests that if tariffs and quotas were re-
moved, individual developing countries could increase their exports by several
hundred percent. Smeets, supra note 5, at 107 (citing I. Trela & J. Whalley,
Unraveling the Threads of the MFA, in TEXTILES TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: ELIMINATING THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 1990s (C.
Hamilton ed., 1990)). Additional studies provide varying estimates of the quota
premium on textile and apparel products. See John Whalley, Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing, in THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS, supra note
3, at 73, 74-75. One study estimates the annual consumer cost per direct job
retained by domestic protection of textiles and clothing to be US$124,686 in
textiles and US$81,973 in apparel. WILLIAM CLINE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD
TRADE IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL 193-94 (1987).
22. Scholars observe, however, that the MFA will persist during the phase-
out process established by the ATC, since restrictions pursuant to the MFA
framework continue until each product is integrated into the GATT. Sanjoy
Bagchi, The Integration of the Textile Trade into GATT, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 31,
33 (1994).
23. ATC, supra note 4, art. 2.
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Stage I January 1, 1995 16 percent
24
Stage II January 1, 1998 17 percent
Stage IH January 1, 2002 18 percent
Stage IV January 1, 2005 all remaining covered products
(potential 49 percent)
2 5
Article 2 of the ATC leaves selection of specific products for
integration during each stage largely to the discretion of
member countries, but requires that these selections incorporate
products from each of the following four groups: tops and yarns,
fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing.26 Thus, through
establishment and implementation of the ATC, member nations
seek to restore market principles for trade in textiles and
apparel and eliminate quantitative restraints that GATT
has legitimized throughout recent decades. 27 If successfully
enforced, this Agreement would fundamentally transform the
current system of world trade in textiles and clothing.
28
Incorporated within the Agreement is a transitional
safeguard mechanism to protect member nations from damaging
increases in imports during the transition period for products
not yet integrated into GATT and not already subject to a
quota.29 Before it may impose a quota on a particular foreign
24. Percentages in this schedule indicate products accounting for not less
than the given percentage of total volume of a member's 1990 imports of the
products listed in the Annex to the ATC. These figures are in terms of
Harmonized Description and Coding System (HS) codes or categories. ATC,
supra note 4, arts. 2(6) and 2(8).
25. ATC, supra note 4, art. 2; Jennifer Hillman, Trade Activities Involving
Textiles and Clothing, in THE GATT, THE WTO, AND THE URUGUAY RouND
AGREEMENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES 879, 882-83
(Practising Law Institute, 1995). The ATC explicitly provides that there shall
be no extension of the agreement. ATC, supra note 4, art. 9.
26. ATC, supra note 4, arts. 2(6) and 2(8).
27. The recent Ministerial Declaration issued by the Ministerial
Conference of the WTO in Singapore includes a section on textiles and clothing
which emphasizes the importance of the ATC "because of its systemic
significance for the rule-based, non-discriminatory trading system and its
contribution to the increase in export earnings of developing countries." World
Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, <http://
www.wto.org/govt/mindec.htm>.
28. See, e.g., Smeets, supra note 5, at 97-98. Unlike its predecessor, the
MFA, in which countries could participate if and when they chose, the ATC
applies to all WTO members, whether or not they were signatories to the MFA.
Bagchi, supra note 22, at 33.
29. ATC, supra note 4, arts. 6(1) and (4); see supra text accompanying note
20 (identifying a comparable "anti-surge" provision in the MFA); see also
Bagchi, supra note 22, at 38 (comparing the transitional safeguard rules under
the MFA and the ATC). This provision, and particularly United States action
pursuant to it, has been the subject of a substantial proportion of the disputes
129
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supplier, a member country, pursuant to Article 6 of the ATC,
must demonstrate that "a particular product is being imported
into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious
damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing like and/or directly competitive products." 30
Moreover, the ATC mandates that claims of serious damage or
actual threat of serious damage be evidenced by an increase in
quantities of total imports of the product in question, rather
than factors such as "technological changes or changes in
consumer preference."'3 1 Article 6 of the ATC specifies eleven
factors which a country invoking the safeguard mechanism shall
examine in making a determination of serious damage or actual
threat of serious damage: output, productivity, utilization of
capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages,
employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment.3 2 This
provision additionally stipulates, however, that none of these
economic variables, "either alone or combined with other factors,
can necessarily give decisive guidance."3 3
Alleged serious damage or actual threat of serious damage
must be attributed to an individual member country, and coun-
tries imposing quotas under the safeguard mechanism must ap-
ply them on a country-by-country and product-by-product ba-
sis. 34 Once a product is integrated into GATT pursuant to
Article 2 of the ATC, recourse through this safeguard mecha-
nism is no longer available, and a WTO member may not impose
import quantitative restraints on those products unless permit-
ted under Article XIX or other import relief provisions of GATT
1994.3 5
under the ATC. For a discussion of TMB and WTO Dispute Settlement Body
panel interpretations of the requirements of this provision, see infra part III.
30. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(2).
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 6(3).
33. Id. For a criticism that this standard of "serious damage" or "actual
threat thereof' is unacceptably vague and unworkable, see John M. Jennings,
In Search of a Standard: "Serious Damage" in the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 272 (1996).
34. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(4).
35. Hillman, supra note 25, at 881, 882. Article XIX of GATT is frequently
referred to as the "escape clause provision," and it generally governs members'
use of safeguard measures to provide temporary relief against imports that
were causing or threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. Jef-
frey J. Schott, Safeguards, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS, supra
note 3, at 113-14. Commentators suggest that once members phase out their
MFA quotas there will be an increased reliance on other techniques, including
antidumping and countervailing duties, to counter "unfair" trade. See, e.g.,
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Countries may unilaterally act under the safeguard mech-
anism, but such actions are subject to review by the Textiles
Monitoring Body established under the ATC.3 6 Before invoking
the transitional safeguard mechanism, an importing country
must attempt to reach an agreement with the exporting country
involved on a mutually acceptable quota level.37 If the parties
do not find common ground within 60 days, the importing coun-
try may impose the quota.38 At that point, or at any point dur-
ing the 60-day consultation period, either member may refer the
matter to the TMB.39 Moreover, the ATC specifies that the tran-
sitional safeguard "should be applied as sparingly as possible. '40
B. THE TEXTILES MONITORING BODY (TMB)
In order to supervise the operation of the accord, the ATC
establishes a quasi-judicial body, the Textiles Monitoring
Body.41 The TMB is a standing body which functions as a forum
for disputes under the accord. 42 According to Article 8(1) of the
ATC, the TMB is to make decisions by consensus. 43 Article 8
merely directs that TMB membership be "balanced and broadly
representative of the Members."44 Of the ten members and one
Reinsch Says U.S. Plans Vigorous Enforcement of WTO Textile Accord, Opposes
Renegotiation, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1473 (Sept. 25, 1996).
36. See infra part II.B. (describing the TMB and its responsibilities under
the ATC).
37. Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, in THE GATT, THE WTO, AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREE-
MENTS ACT: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES, supra note 25, at
893.
38. Id.
39. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(10).
40. Id. art. 6(1).
41. Id. art. 8(1). Disputes under the ATC, then, are governed by a specific
set of rules, distinct from those governing most trade within GATT. For a brief
explanation of the general GATT dispute settlement procedures, now strength-
ened through negotiations in the Uruguay Round, see John Jackson, Dispute
Settlement Procedures, in THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS, supra
note 3, at 117.
42. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(3).
43. To explain the intended interpretation of "consensus" in this context,
the ATC merely stipulates "[ilt is understood, however, that consensus within
the TMB does not require the assent or concurrence of members appointed by
Members involved in an unresolved issue under review by the TMB." Id. art.
8(2). Moreover, in what is now recognized as a serious problem, the ATC speci-
fies only that "[tihe TMB shall develop its own working procedures." Id. Subse-
quently formulated working procedures of the TMB declare that its reports on
disputed cases shall include a factual presentation of the issues and a common
rationale for its recommendations. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 63.
44. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(1).
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chairperson who constitute this body, half are from exporting
countries and half from importing countries. 45 Despite the ATC
provision directing that TMB members are to serve in an ad per-
sonam basis,46 determining the composition of the TMB was a
highly controversial matter.47 This controversy perhaps indi-
cates that representatives of member countries acknowledge not
only the significance of the TMB and its duties, but also the po-
tential for TMB members to make politically based decisions. 48
In accordance with Article 6(9) of the ATC, the TMB shall
determine whether an agreement regarding a transitional safe-
guard reached between two countries is justified under Article 6
provisions. 49 If, through bilateral consultations, the parties are
unable to develop a mutually agreeable solution, the ATC autho-
rizes the TMB to investigate the matter upon the request of
either party to the dispute.50 In so doing, the TMB determines
whether there was serious damage, or actual threat of serious
damage, examines causes of the damage, and makes appropriate
recommendations to the relevant parties.51
Member countries are to "endeavour to accept in full the
recommendations of the TMB,"5 2 which also supervises the im-
plementation of those recommendations. If a country does not
accept the recommendations of the TMB and the matter remains
unresolved, the ATC provides that either Member may bring the
45. The WTO General Council determined the following composition of the
TMB for the initial 1995-1997 period: the United States, the European Union,
Norway (representing Turkey, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia), Canada, Japan, South Korea (to alternate with Hong Kong), In-
dia (to alternate with one of the following: Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia), Brazil,
Pakistan (to alternate with China), and Indonesia. Jim Ostroff, TMB Verdicts:
Are the Scales Off Balance?, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Oct. 24, 1995, at 5; WTO
Nominates Committee Heads at First Session of Council Meeting, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 225-26 (Feb. 1, 1995). Andras Szepesi of Hungary was
named chairperson of the TMB. Id. at 226.
46. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(1). Instead of discharging their duties as rep-
resentatives of their governments, TMB members are to serve in an individual,
neutral capacity.
47. See Jennings, supra note 33, at 287-89 (describing this controversy in
some detail).
48. Id. at 289.
49. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(9). See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying
text (detailing the provisions of the ATC's transitional safeguard mechanism).
50. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(10).
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 8(9).
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dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO by in-
voking Article XXIII of GATT 1994.53
Among its other assigned duties, the TMB assists the Coun-
cil for Trade in Goods in conducting a major review of the inte-
gration program's implementation before the conclusion of each
stage of the program. 54 The ATC authorizes the Council for
Trade in Goods, at its discretion and by consensus, to ensure the
rights and obligations of member countries remain balanced
pursuant to the implementation of the Agreement.55
Like the ATC, the MFA provided for a quasi-legal standing
body, the Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB).56 The supervisory
duties, powers, and organization of the TMB roughly correspond
with those assigned to the TSB. 57 The MFA authorized the TSB
to conduct inquiries, to make recommendations to interested
parties regarding any disputed matters, and to review annually
all textiles restrictions pursuant to the MFA.58 During the
MFA era, the TSB shared power to interpret the MFA with the
Textiles Committee, which was a larger entity consisting of all
parties to the MFA.59 Accordingly, if the TSB failed to resolve a
dispute under the MFA, the parties could report any legal find-
ings to the Textiles Committee. 60 Article 11(9) of the MFA fur-
ther authorized the GATT Council, through normal GATT
dispute settlement procedures, to hear textile disputes if the
TSB was unable to resolve them.61
53. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(10). A recent WTO Dispute Settlement Body
panel report on a textiles matter ruled that the explicit endorsement of the
TMB is not required for a member to impose quotas under the transitional safe-
guard mechanism. United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses From India, Jan. 6, 1997, WT/DS33/R, para. 7.57 [hereinaf-
ter Indian Imports Measure].
54. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(11).
55. ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(12).
56. Niels Blokker & Jan Deelstra, Towards a Termination of the Multi-Fi-
bre Arrangement, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 97, 99-100 (1994).
57. Id. at 112. The TSB was comprised of eight members and one chairper-
son. Henry R. Zheng, The Fourth Multifibre Arrangement and the New Legal
Regime for International Trade in Textiles, 25 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 334
(1987). See infra notes 191-196 and accompanying text (explaining the percep-
tions of the TSB's functioning and their possible impact on perceptions of the
TMB).
58. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIsPUTEs
63 (1978); Zheng, supra note 57, at 334.
59. Id. at 334-35.
60. Hudec, supra note 58, at 63.
61. Zheng, supra note 57, at 343.
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III. POLITICS, PRESSURE AND NONCOMPLIANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES' TEXTILE REGIME
In general, the United States has "by far the worst compli-
ance record" with the GATT, based on the findings of a compre-
hensive survey of GATT complaint outcomes. 62 Thus far, the
United States' compliance record appears to be equally poor spe-
cifically with regard to compliance with the ATC. This may be
attributed to the fact that many textile and apparel industry
representatives generally oppose the WTO and NAFTA based on
their beliefs that these agreements undermine the sovereignty
of the United States and do not serve the interests of the textile
industry.63 In a joint submission opposing the ATC, four ap-
parel manufacturers associations argued that the Agreement
will eliminate 33 to 75 percent of the domestic apparel produc-
tion industry by accelerating import penetration. 64
Since the ATC took effect, developing countries in the Asia-
Pacific region have questioned the commitment of richer, export-
ing countries, particularly the United States, to effectively im-
plement the ATC. 65 They have protested that the European
Union and the United States have not adequately fulfilled their
obligations under the ATC. 66 These doubts are likely related to
the United States' selection of products for integration at each
stage of the liberalization program. Despite protest from the im-
porting community, the American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
62. Robert E. Hudec et. al, A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 48 (1993) [hereinafter Statistical
Profile]; see also Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URU-
GUAY ROuND 204 (1990) (explaining that "[tihe long chain of bad behavior on the
US report card shows a rather deeply rooted one-sidedness in US attitudes to-
ward GATT legal obligation").
63. Hudec, Statistical Profile, supra note 62.
64. USITC, supra note 11, at 22.
65. EU/WTO: EU Begins Shaping Its Singapore Agenda, EuR. REP., Sept.
14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11073006. This region depends in large part on
the North America and European Union markets for its textile exports. Id.
Representatives of Central American countries complain about the "unre-
strained use of the safeguard mechanism" under the ATC and accuse importing
countries of "foot-dragging." Central American States Assail WTO Inaction on
Textiles, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, Library
News and Business (World) file. They assert it was precisely those promises to
dismantle the quota system that led them to agree to negotiate on intellectual
property and services issues. Id.; see also India: New Challenges in World Tex-
tile Trade, Bus. LINE, (THE HINDu), July 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12314250 ("no product of commercial significance has been integrated in the
first stage" (1995-97)).
66. Shada Islam, Safety in Numbers: Asia's Textile Exporters Fret Over
Quota, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 11, 1996, at 74.
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tute, which represents the American textile industry,
aggressively urged Congress to specify that tariffs on import
sensitive products would be the last targeted for integration
under the ATC. 67 By manipulating its data, the United States
plans to maintain fully 89 percent of its quotas on clothing until
the final stage of the ATC's integration scheme and has freed
many products which were not initially under quota restrictions,
such as parachutes and seatbelts. 68 This U.S. strategy has
caused some importer and retailer representatives to refer to the
final stage of the integration program as "the cliff."69 Although
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore responded to this
issue in the Ministerial Declaration noting importers' concerns,
the importers and many exporters are disappointed with the
outcome. They believe the Conference provided no substantive
commitment from importing countries to remove restrictions on
popular items.70
Textile and apparel lobbies in the United States have al-
ready voiced their dissatisfaction with the GATT, as well as with
many other articulated movements toward trade liberalization.
Having enjoyed heavy protection under the special treatment of
the MFA and justified job loss and industry harm, the U.S. tex-
tile and apparel industries and their representatives in Con-
gress are reluctant to restructure and allow market forces to
govern trade in this sector.71 In response, wholesalers and re-
67. Jim Morrissey, Jury Remains Out on WTO, NAFTA, TEXTILE.WORLD,
Mar. 1996, at 40, 42. For a schedule of U.S. integration of textile and apparel
products under quota, see U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 33-34 tbl.III:l.
68. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 2-3; International Trade: Implementation
Issues Concerning the World Trade Organization: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means 104th Cong. 9-10
(1996) [hereinafter Implementation Hearings] (statement of Jayetta Z. Hecker,
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security
and International Affairs Division).
69. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 3.
70. Somporn Thapanachai, WTO Meeting - Narongchai Claim Thais Win
Concessions All Round, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 16, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Library News and Business (World) file; World Trade Organization, supra note
27, para. 15. The Ministerial Declaration includes, "[wie attach importance to
the implementation of this Agreement so as to ensure an effective transition to
GATT 1994 by way of integration which is progressive in character .... We
reiterate the importance of fully implementing the provisions of the ATC.... "
Id.
71. See generally Landaw, supra note 15 (examining the political strength
of the domestic textile and apparel coalition and its effects on the formulation of
U.S. trade policy). In the context of recently proposed legislation before the
U.S. House of Representatives, which would instruct the United States admin-
istration to negotiate a free trade agreement with countries of sub-Saharan Af-
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tailers argue that the United States textile industry has exag-
gerated the negative impacts of the ATC and point to several of
its significant positive effects: reduced costs of both domestic
and imported clothing, broader selection of available apparel
products, improved competitiveness both abroad and in the
United States, and elimination of the welfare costs associated
with MFA quotas.7 2 Still others argue that after decades of
postponing adjustment to intense global competition, traders in
this sector should "plan their international marketing strategies
rationally to meet the new competitive challenges. ''73
Commentators consistently acknowledge that implementa-
tion of the major liberalizing objectives of the ATC, and more
generally of the new GATT agreements and rules, requires "sub-
stantial high-level political commitment and resources."7 4 For
years, legislators have been operating in a climate of general
consensus in favor of restrictive trade legislation. 75 In particu-
lar, textile and apparel industries, unions, and associations have
developed a "politically powerful coalition that has enjoyed ex-
traordinary success in mobilizing the support of congressmen
across a wide spectrum of the political landscape."76 One author
suggests that until legislative measures recognize and confront
this coalition, "liberalization of textile and apparel trade will be
little more than a theorist's dream."77
TMB members themselves report that the United States en-
gaged in more safeguard activity under the ATC than members
of the Body had expected. 78 Since the ATC was intended to be a
liberalizing agreement, some TMB members expected less safe-
rica, one ranking Democrat appealed, "We can't afford to lose even one more
textile job." House Committee Approves Legislation to Boost Ties with Sub-
Saharan Africa, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1165 (July 2, 1997).
72. House Committee Approves Legislation to Boost Ties with Sub-Saharan
Africa, supra note 71, at 23.
73. See Hughes, supra note 18, at 29.
74. See, e.g., Raby, supra note 3, at 22 (identifying the primary issues and
challenges in the "New World Trading System" after the Uruguay Round).
75. Landaw, supra note 15, at 217. Administration officials recently re-
ported that they anticipate the likely revival of United States trade deficits with
Asia will provoke a backlash in Congress. U.S. Fears Revival of Trade Deficits,
STAR TRIB., Sept. 21, 1997, at A5.
76. Landaw, supra note 15, at 218. Landaw's article assesses the organiza-
tional strength, large numbers and regional concentration, direct support of
congressional candidates, and other political considerations with regard to the
strength of the textile and apparel coalition. Id.
77. Id. at 234.
78. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 66.
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guard activity than occurred under the MFA. 79 In the first
twenty months of the ATC, the United States had already at-
tempted to establish thirty new quotas, twenty-five of which
targeted trade with WTO members.80 Indeed, at the close of the
first year of the ATC, the United States had more quotas than at
the beginning of the year.8 1
The ATC, however, does not limit the number of times a
member country may invoke the transitional safeguard mecha-
nism. One U.S. Trade Representative official for textile matters
emphasized that the ATC is a negotiated document.8 2 Both tex-
tile exporting and importing countries secured benefits in the
negotiation process; textile exporters secured the ATC provi-
sions for integration of textile and apparel trade into GATT dis-
ciplines, while the textile importers secured the provisions for a
remedy in the transitional safeguard mechanism.83 As a result
of the negotiating process, then, member countries have the
right to seek a remedy in accordance with the relevant ATC
rules for damage caused by the implementation of the new liber-
alizing rules.
Significantly, only one other country-Brazil-invoked the
safeguard clause of the ATC between January 1995 and the
third quarter of 1996,84 and the TMB has yet to agree with a
United States determination of serious damage in the context of
the transitional safeguard mechanism. More specifically, TMB
members remarked that the Committee for the Implementation
79. Id.
80. Singapore Hearing, supra note 21. Indeed, since the ATC expanded the
range of products which it governs, the United States has so far succeeded in
evading integration of quota products. "Thus, the first stage of integration,
which ostensibly accounted for 16 percent of the trade covered by the ATC, in-
cluded only products that had been outside the quota program and were never
likely to have been considered sensitive or vulnerable to the imposition of quo-
tas." Id. Other evidence that the United States is not living up to the spirit of
the ATC is the fact that its already published integration schedule postpones
the integration of 70 percent of imports by value until the very end of the ten-
year liberalization period. Williams, supra note 8. Critics assert that such
postponement will only result in increased resistance by the domestic indus-
tries to future elimination of import restraints. Id.
81. Article 6 of the ATC permits countries to introduce new quantitative
restrictions on products which have not yet been covered by the agreement. See
supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing the safeguard mechanism
of the ATC).
82. Telephone Interview with Alicia Greenidge, Office of the United States
Trade Representative (Oct. 8, 1997).
83. Id.
84. WTO Panel Favors India on Woolen Exports to U.S., Bus. LiNE (THE
Hw'Du) Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8202639.
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of Textile Agreements (CITA) did not adequately consider "the
amount of a country's world market share of the category in
question when making a call."8 5 Additionally, TMB members
doubted whether import increases had met the ATC's requisite
"sharp and substantial" threshold and questioned why there
were changes in the direction of data levels during the time from
the consultation period to the TMB review.8 6
While U.S. officials target the TMB for its lack of trans-
parency, the U.S. Administration's own procedures and policies
in this area suffer comparable inadequacies. A recent report
from the General Accounting Office charges that United States
trade officials routinely impose quotas on foreign textiles with-
out proof that there is serious damage or actual threat of serious
damage to U.S. industry, as required under the transitional
safeguard measure.8 7 Additionally, this report charges that
CITA functions in great secrecy, noting that CITA has no docu-
mented procedures or guidelines for deciding when to impose
quotas.88 Furthermore, CITA does not release voting records or
minutes of its meetings.8 9
Importers and retailers in the United States document
these deficiencies in their complaints as well. One representa-
tive has noted:
[u]ntil now, decisions to regulate textiles and apparel trade have been
in closed rooms. There is no public notice of the meetings and minutes
of those meetings. There is no opportunity for public comment before a
decision is made . . . trade policy decisions concerning the use of the
transitional safeguard should be subject to public process and consul-
tation with all interested parties.9
0
The recent WTO panel report on the dispute between Costa
Rica and the United States over underwear quotas 91 supports
85. Id. See also U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 66, 67 (describing further crit-
icisms directed at U.S. calls involving products exported under the Special Ac-
cess Program). For a brief explanation of CITA, see supra note 18.
86. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 11.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. CITA officials report they typically use majority voting when mak-
ing decisions about whether to impose quotas. Id. at 7. CITA generally relies
on the "continuous monitoring and analysis of trade and economic data" that
the Department of Commerce's Office of Textiles and Apparel provides as a
source for information on domestic industry. Id. at 6. For an overview of
CITA's process in determining when to impose import restraints, see id. at 41
fig. IV.1.
89. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 41 fig.IV.1.
90. Singapore Hearing, supra note 21.
91. WTO-Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT105241R (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinaf-
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the proposition that the United States' implementation of the
Agreement is deficient. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body
panel severely criticized the United States' invocations of the
ATC's transitional safeguard mechanism. 92 The Panel recom-
mended that the United States immediately remove the dis-
puted import quota because it found the United States failed to
demonstrate that its industry had suffered, or was threatened
with, serious damage caused by those imports.93 The Panel
found that the data offered by CITA to rationalize imposition of
the quota was insufficient to show even "threat of serious dam-
age" to United States textile industry.94
The report assessed CITA's decision to impose the restric-
tion on imports of Costa Rican underwear. In this assessment,
the Panel criticized CITA's review for being vague, speculative,
and indefinite, and further noted numerous discrepancies in in-
formation and statistics. 95 In particular, the Panel noted that
CITA frequently supported its statements with information on
only one company, which the panel deemed insufficient. 96 Fur-
thermore, the Panel encountered neither a discussion or show-
ing of causality in the market statement, which Article 6.2 of the
ATC requires. 97 Another flaw the Panel noted in the United
States' procedure was a lack of comparative assessment of Costa
Rican imports and imports from other exporting Members men-
tioned in the U.S. statement. 98
The panel also concluded that the United States failed to
demonstrate actual threat of serious damage, thereby violating
ter Underwear Restrictions Report]; see infra part IV.A (detailing the history of
this case and panel report issued in this matter).
92. Underwear Restrictions Report, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id., para. 8.3. The U.S. GAO reports that in creating statements to
support imposing quotas, the Department of Commerce's Office of Textiles and
Apparel (OTEXA) generally limits its focus to import surges and declines in
domestic production and merely assumes a causal link between these two fac-
tors. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 53. Officials from OTEXA rejected the possi-
bility of performing econometric analysis to analyze the strength of this causal
link because quotas distort correlation between domestic imports and demand
and because such modeling is more appropriate for broader measures of eco-
nomic activity. Id. at n.3.
98. Underwear Restrictions Report, supra note 91, para. 7.51. In its analy-
sis, the Panel examined the U.S. agreements with other exporters: "[wie find
that the United States cannot enter into agreements permitting imports of
170,305,774 dozen units of a product ... and at the time claim that imports of
14,423,178 dozen units are contributing to serious damage." Id.
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its obligations under Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC. 99 The panel
based this conclusion on the fact that CITA's market statement
contained no analysis of, or even reference to, prospective dam-
age, which the panel determined is required for a showing of ac-
tual threat of serious damage pursuant to the ATC. 100
The panelists who authored the recent Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) report on the matter of Indian wool im-
ports also expressed the opinion that CITA's procedure for in-
voking the ATC's transitional safeguard mechanism is severely
flawed. 1° 1 Like the Underwear Restrictions Report panel, the
Indian wool imports panel severely criticized the U.S. market
statement for its absence of evidence that increased imports
caused serious damage or threat thereof.10 2 Specifically, the
panel noted again the absence of the requisite precise industry
statements in the submitted U.S. market statement. 0 3 For ex-
ample, the U.S. market statement incorporated general wage
and employment information for the woven shirt and blouse in-
dustry, but not for the woven wool shirt and blouse industry. 10 4
Under the terms of the ATC, any member country invoking the
safeguard mechanism must examine the eleven designated eco-
nomic variables before deciding to impose a quota, and the panel
noted the U.S. market statement did not consider eight of these
eleven factors with regard to the specific industry.'0 5 The panel
criticized the data provided in the U.S. market statement, fre-
quently characterizing the data as "vague," "imprecise," and
99. Id. para. 8.3.
100. The panel described the distinct requirements it determined that the
ATC mandates for demonstrating serious damage or actual threat thereof:
"[clonsequently, in our view, a finding on serious damage requires the party...
to demonstrate that damage has already occurred, whereas a finding on 'actual
threat of serious damage' requires the same party to demonstrate that, unless
action is taken, damage will most likely occur in the near future." Id. para.
7.55.
101. See infra part IV.B. (describing the history and outcome of this case).
102. See Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 7.51 ("Since the
United States did not include any specific information for the particular indus-
try concerned, it therefore, could not make any convincing analysis as to the
causation of serious damage or actual threat thereof to that particular industry
of woven wool shirts and blouses.").
103. See Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 7.33 (The market
statement "defines specifically the product category on which the safeguard ac-
tion was to be applied: woven wool shirts and blouses, category 440. However,
much of the data are not related to that 'particular industry' or to that specific
segment of production, as required by article 63 of the ATC.").
104. Id. para. 7.33.
105. Id. para. 7.51.
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"contradictory." 10 6 Additionally, the Panel concluded the United
States failed to prove, and, in fact, neglected to even address,
against ATC requirements, that Indian imports, rather than
technological changes or consumer preference, caused the al-
leged condition of U.S. domestic industry.' 07 Despite these sub-
stantial criticisms from the panel, one U.S. official retorted that
the report would have no impact on the United States' textile
program. l0 8
IV. HOW THE TMB FUNCTIONS UNDER PRESSURE
A. THE COSTA RicAN UNDERWEAR DISPUTE
In March of 1995, the United States, acting pursuant to Ar-
ticle 6 of the ATC, unilaterally restricted imports of underwear
from Costa Rica for the year ending March 26, 1996.109 In the
fall of 1995, the TMB ruled that the United States failed to
demonstrate Costa Rican underwear imports had caused serious
damage to United States producers." 0 The TMB, however,
failed to reach the necessary consensus on the issue of whether
actual threat of serious damage existed."' As a result, Costa
Rica directed its complaint to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
for arbitration, since lengthy consultations with the United
States were ineffective." 2
On November 8, 1996, the Dispute Settlement Body panel
issued its report in this matter, heavily criticizing the United
States' actions." 3 The panel recommended that the United
States immediately remove the import quota because it found
the United States had grossly failed to demonstrate that its do-
mestic industry had suffered serious damage as a result of those
106. Id. paras. 7.37-7.48.
107. Id. para. 7.50. This panel rejected India's argument that a member
may maintain a safeguard under the ATC only if the TMB adequately endorses
such action. Id. para. 7.57.
108. WTO Panel Favours India on Woolen Exports to U.S., supra note 84.
109. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre
Underwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 2 (Feb. 10, 1997).
As a justification for this action, the United States asserted that imports were
causing job loss and damaging domestic underwear makers. Id.
110. Id. at 3; see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (explaining the
panel's lengthy criticism of CITA's procedure for invoking the transitional safe-
guard mechanism in this case).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Underwear Restrictions Report, supra note 91, para. 8.3. This is the
first panel report on textiles since the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Id.
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imports. 114 Moreover, the panel concluded that the data which
CITA supplied to justify the imposition of the quota was insuffi-
cient to demonstrate even a "threat of serious damage" to United
States industry. 115
In this report, the panel articulated a standard for a finding
of "serious damage" and "threat of serious damage." 116 To
demonstrate "serious damage," the panel required the party to
show damage had already occurred. 117 To demonstrate "actual
threat of serious damage," a party must supply evidence that,
unless action is taken, damage will most likely occur in the fu-
ture."118 Generally, the panel determined that Article 6 of the
ATC should be interpreted narrowly to effect its clear objective
that transitional safeguards are to be used as sparingly as
possible.1 9
B. THE INDIAN DISPUTE
In another recent dispute, India ultimately invoked the for-
mal WTO dispute settlement procedures after the TMB failed to
settle its dispute with the United States regarding restrictions
on woolen clothing. 120 In April 1995, the United States, pursu-
ant to Article 6 of the ATC, requested consultations with India
for the purposes of imposing quotas on woven wool shirts and
blouses.' 21 The parties failed to reach a mutual settlement
within the 60-day consultation period, so the United States im-
posed the restraint and notified the TMB of its actions. 122 In the
fall of 1995, the TMB ruled that the significant increase in In-
dian shipments of woven wool shirts and blouses to the United
States caused actual threat of serious damage to U.S. manufac-
turers. 23 Although India requested that the TMB examine its
arguments in this matter, in accordance with Article 8(10) of the
ATC, the TMB considered its review complete, and thus made
114. Id.
115. Id. para. 7.53-55.
116. Id. para. 7.55.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. para. 7.19; see ATC, supra note 4, art. 6(1) ("The transitional safe-
guard should be applied as sparingly as possible, consistently with the provi-
sions of this Article and the effective implementation of the integration process
under this Agreement").
120. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 2.12.
121. Id. para. 2.5.
122. Id. para. 2.7.
123. Id. para. 2.9.
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no additional recommendations. 124 The United States blocked
India's request for the establishment of a Dispute Settlement
Understanding panel to examine these complaints. 125 Three
weeks later, at a special meeting, India again requested that the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel to reexamine
its complaints. 126 Under the new WTO rules, a second such re-
quest must be granted. 127
On January 6, 1997, a WTO dispute resolution panel issued
a report on this matter which ruled that the United States im-
port restrictions violate the ATC. 128 Again, the dispute settle-
ment panel determined that the United States did not
adequately document even an actual threat of serious dam-
age. 129 Despite the panel's failure to find the United States had
suffered damage, U.S. trade officials maintain this decision was,
in fact, a victory for the United States. 130 They claim the Dis-
pute Settlement Body panel report merely demands that the
U.S. Administration incorporate more data in those petitions it
submits to the TMB. 13 1 In its decision, the panel clarified that it
was examining merely the legality of the relevant United States
actions, rather than the responses of the TMB in this matter.132
124. Id. para. 2.10-2.11.
125. Textiles: U.S. Temporarily Blocks Move by India on Textile Import
Curbs, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 577 (Apr. 3, 1996).
126. Id.
127. Textiles: WTO to Probe Indian Complaints Against U.S. Textile Safe-
guards, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 670 (Apr. 24, 1996).
128. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 8.1. See supra notes 95-
102 and accompanying text (detailing the panel's criticisms of the market state-
ment CITA provided to justify imposing the import restraint). One month prior
to this ruling CITA withdrew the import restriction under examination. WTO
Rules Against U.S. on India Quotas, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Jan. 8, 1997, at 200.
Addressing this withdrawal, the Chair of CITA explained it was a mere coinci-
dence, stating, "[tirade had declined dramatically, and that is why the quota
was dropped." Id.
129. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 7.53.
130. U.S. Insists It Didn't Lose WTO Ruling On India Textiles, Dow Jones
News Service, Jan. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL, ALLNEWS PLUS. U.S. tex-
tile negotiator Rita Hayes commented, "[tlo say the U.S. lost is wrong. We won
the case." Id. This statement may be, in part, an acknowledgment of the one
point on which the Dispute Settlement Body panel ruled in favor of the United
States. The panel ruled that no explicit endorsement of the TMB is necessary
for an importing member country to impose new quotas pursuant to the ATC's
transitional safeguard mechanism- WTO Panel Rules Against U.S. on Shirts,
Sidesteps Broader Issues, 15 INSIDE U.S. TRADE No. 2, at 6 (Jan. 10, 1997).
131. U.S. Insists It Didn't Lose WTO Ruling On India Textiles, supra note
130.
132. WTO Panel Rules Against United States in Case of Woven Wool Shirts
from India, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 47 (Jan. 8, 1997).
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In response to this report, however, it is expected that the TMB
will "tighten its requirements of proof of damage." 33
C. OTHER DISPUTES BEFORE THE TMB
During 1995, the United States, under the direction of
CITA, issued 28 calls.' 34 Of these 28 calls, the TMB reviewed
and issued reports on seven disputed invocations of the safe-
guard mechanism. 135 In two of these seven disputes, the TMB
concluded that the United States had demonstrated neither seri-
ous damage nor threat thereof. 136 For three of these calls, the
TMB determined that the United States had not demonstrated
serious damage but was unable to reach a consensus on whether
actual threat of serious damage existed.137 The TMB found that
one call was justified based on actual threat of serious dam-
age, 138 and the TMB disposed of another dispute without an
analysis of serious damage. 139 The other calls were either re-
scinded or the involved parties reached an agreement before the
TMB completed its review.
In surveying the activity of the TMB during 1995, it is clear
that the TMB did not entirely submit to the political pressures
the United States exerted. In fact, some propose that the United
States has learned, as a result of these outcomes, that it cannot
resort to the safeguard mechanism so often, which may be de-
duced from the fact that the United States invoked it only once
between January and September 1996.140 Nevertheless, the
TMB ruled that the United States had demonstrated actual
threat of serious damage from Indian imports of woven wool
shirts and blouses, and could not reach consensus on whether
the United States had demonstrated actual threat of serious
133. Frances Williams, US Loses WTO Textiles Case, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 7,
1997.
134. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 4.
135. Id. at 64.
136. Id. These calls involved: (1) imports of cotton and manmade fiber
nightwear and pajamas from Honduras; and (2) imports of men's and boys' wool
coats from India. Id. at 64-65.
137. Id. at 64. These calls involved: (1) Costa Rican imports of cotton and
manmade fiber underwear; (2) Indian imports of women's and girls' wool coats;
and (3) imports of cotton and mamnade fiber underwear from Honduras. Id. at
64-65.
138. Id. at 64. This is the call involving Indian imports of woven wool shirts
and blouses. Id. at 65.
139. Id. at 64.
140. WTO Rules in India's Favour, THE HINDu, Jan. 9, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7215468, ALLNEWS PLUS.
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damage in the case of Costa Rican imports of underwear. With-
out information clarifying how the TMB developed these deter-
minations, one must question how the TMB arrived at such
conclusions in light of the severe criticisms the DSU panels di-
rected at CITA's proffered evidence.
D. OTHER CRITIcIsMs DIRECTED AT THE TMB
Almost since its inception, the TMB has suffered a constant
attack by industries and countries with regard to its function-
ing. Specific criticisms of the TMB from both exporters and im-
porters include the body's lack of transparency, a sense of
impartiality in the body, and an inability to reach consensus in a
number of cases. 141 Developing countries continue to protest
that the TMB has failed to prevent developed countries from re-
taining their non-tariff barriers.14 2 Among the non-tariff barri-
ers cited are transitional safeguards, unilateral changes in rules
of origin, new restrictions resulting from regional integration,
and lack of awareness of commitments in quota growth rates.1 43
As a result, several countries demanded that the WTO's Minis-
terial Conference in Singapore empower the TMB to act as a
mechanism for liberalization in the textiles industry.144
1. Lack of Transparency in the TMB
Both exporters and importers heavily criticize the lack of
transparency in the TMB. The recent Ministerial Declaration
141. Frances Williams, Poorer Nations Plan Attack on Textile Barriers, FIN.
TIMES, July 25, 1996, at 5.
142. EUIWTO: EU Begins Shaping Its Singapore Agenda, EuR. REP., Sept.
14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11073006.
143. Id. In fact, textile industry advocates in the United States injected a
rule of origin change into the GATT-implementing legislation. Under the modi-
fied rule, the site of sewing is designated as the country of origin, while previ-
ously it was the country where the apparel was cut. Joyce Barrett, House
Drafts Textile Bill Designed to Open Markets, 26 DAILY NEWS REC. 114, June 13,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8654004. In July of 1996, Philippines formally re-
quested the TMB to examine this change in rules of origin. Textiles: Philippines
Wants New U.S. Origin Rules Scrutinized by Textile Monitoring Body, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1131 (July 10, 1996). The European Union has
also requested WTO consultations with the United States on this rule of origin
change, claiming that the new rules violate obligations pursuant to, inter alia,
Articles 2.4, 4.2 and 4.4 of the ATC. WTO, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO
Disputes, Pending Consultations, para. 24 (Sept. 9, 1997) (visited Sept. 27,
1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>. This complaint has been
referred to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the TMB. EU Challenges
U.S. Textile Origin Rules in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 999 (June 4, 1997).
144. Id.
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issued by the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore
recognized this concern. 145 Representatives have referred to the
proceedings of the TMB as "secretive" and complain that the
TMB does not even circulate the agenda for its proceedings. 146
In recent Congressional testimony, a practitioner in the area of
international trade remarked:
The initial decisions of the Textiles Monitoring Body have not been
particularly helpful to U.S. Administrators or industry in understand-
ing the real basis for decisions by the TMB. In the years of transition
from the MFA, guidance from the Textiles Monitoring Body will lose
credibility if its decisions do not appear to follow a consistent standard
that permits countries to take actions when appropriate. 14 7
Indeed, officials in member countries have urged a mandate
for transparency in the TMB to make its work more accountable.
Specifically, they call for open meetings and "public issuance of
written decisions and recommendations that articulate the
factors and rules considered and the reasons for the findings or
recommendations." 148 One U.S. industry representative com-
mented, "[ciryptic two or three sentence conclusory statements
do not provide interested persons with an understanding of why
the particular conclusion was reached. Nor do they provide use-
ful precedent for future decisions."1 49 That representative fur-
ther argued that "[riationales and precedents are especially
necessary in the case of the TMB because the membership of the
body will change on an annual basis... To educate future mem-
bers of the TMB and to ensure continuity and consistency, a
solid body of precedents is essential."150 In December of 1995,
Hong Kong's WTO ambassador explained that WTO member
countries must secure more knowledge about the functioning of
the TMB, particularly with regard to the rationale behind its
145. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Textiles and Clothing, para. 15
(Dec. 13, 1996) (visited Sept. 27, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/govt/mindec.htm>.
The text of the Ministerial Declaration states "[wie agree, keeping in view its
quasi-judicial nature,' the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) should achieve
transparency in providing rationale for its findings and recommendations. We
expect that the TMB shall make findings and recommendations whenever
called upon to do so under the agreement." Id.
146. Hong Kong Urges TMB to Reveal Reasons for Its Recommendations,
DAILY NEWS REC., Dec. 22, 1995, at 12.
147. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1996) (statement of Terence P. Stewart,
Managing Partner, Stewart and Stewart).
148. Singapore Hearing, supra note 21.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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recommendations and its frequent inability to reach consensus
after lengthy deliberation. 15 1
Subsequently formulated working procedures of the TMB
state that its reports on disputed cases shall include a factual
presentation of the issues and a common rationale for its recom-
mendations. In the past, the reports have not supplied detailed
reasoning to support the Body's conclusions with regard to the
existence of threat or actual threat of serious damage. 15 2 To
achieve effective implementation of the ATC, countries must
clearly know the extent of their rights and obligations under the
Agreement.
Comments from some representatives on this issue of trans-
parency in the TMB seem to insist upon a stare decisis rule.153
The international legal system, however, does not espouse the
mandate of common law jurisprudence for courts to observe
under a strict legal precedent or stare decisis rule.'5 Thus, a
GATT panel or the TMB, in issuing its recommendations, need
not rely on the findings of previous panels or adhere to its previ-
ous rulings.' 55 Nevertheless, GATT panels tend to "follow what
they deem to be the 'wisdom' of prior panel reports."' 56
The Clinton Administration has made transparency in the
WTO as a whole a priority. Indeed, achieving transparency
would allow the United States to gain a better understanding of
how the WTO works as well as specific rationales behind its ac-
tions.157 Importers in the United States argue that this objec-
tive ought to extend to textile trade and the TMB.158
Information about the logical structure and analysis of TMB de-
cisions may well be of particular value in devising domestic
trade policies and administrative procedures for safeguard ac-
tion. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the TMB, espe-
cially when comprised of different members, 159 will adjudicate
similar matters in an identical fashion.
151. Hong Kong Urges TMB To Reveal Reasons for Its Recommendations,
supra note 146, at 12.
152. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 63.
153. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (setting forth the criti-
cisms voiced by Julia K. Hughes).
154. Jackson, supra note 41, at 120.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Singapore Hearing, supra note 21.
158. Id.
159. The complicated compromise which the WTO ultimately secured for
composition of the TMB calls for several positions to alternate between coun-
tries. WTO Nominates Committee Heads at First Session of Council Meeting, 12
147
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2. Lack of Impartiality in the TMB
There have been serious questions as to whether TMB
members act in their personal capacities as the ATC directs or
instead act as representatives of their governments, considering
their own governments' economic policy and interests. These
doubts threaten the credibility of the Body as a whole. 160 In par-
ticular, Hong Kong has publicly protested that the TMB has not
ruled against the United States' establishment of quotas which
violated the ATC.161 In response to these concerns, several
WTO officials emphasized that because of powerful anti-WTO
sentiment in the United States Congress, the TMB must main-
tain its neutrality and legal credibility.162 Some commentators
more generally maintain that the GATT dispute resolution pro-
cess is and will continue to be "characterized by political
'abuse."1 63
On the other hand, discouraged by the early rulings of the
TMB against the United States, a representative of the Ameri-
can Textile Manufacturers Institute has alleged some members
of the Body appointed by exporting countries have ignored the
merits of United States' safeguard measures, favoring instead
the interests of their own countries. 164 Industry advisors argue
that once the TMB becomes politicized, dispute resolution is un-
predictable. 16 5 One trade official commented, "[tihe impartiality
of the TMB is a must, if we are to keep the phaseout ... from
turning into a north-south confrontation."166 If the TMB is not
impartial in its decision-making capacity, "exporting countries
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 225-26 (Feb. 1, 1995); see also supra note 45
(detailing the composition of the TMB for the 1995-1997 period).
160. Id. One representative for the American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
tute claims that the TMB regularly attacks the United States' efforts to avert
market disruption with use of the safeguard mechanism. Morrissey, supra note
67, at 41.
161. Williams, supra note 8, at 4.
162. Id.
163. Note, supra note 2, at 1726-27 n.83.
164. Ostroff, supra note 45, at 5.
165. Id. Others explain the poor record of the United States by alleging that
the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements simply made calls
which were unjustified. Id. Some dismiss the United States' complaints, attrib-
uting them to the desires of domestic industry to maintain quotas in the face of
WTO strategies to liberalize. Id. They contend the fact that United States' al-
lies such as Canada, the EU, and Japan voted against the United States sup-
ports this assertion. Id.
166. John Zarocostas, Global Board Hears Case on Underwear Quotas, Wo-
MEN'S WEAR DAILY, July 14, 1995, at 11.
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could find their textile industries at the mercy of CITA."167 Con-
versely, lack of impartiality in the TMB could also "produce in-
adequate transitional protection for U.S. industries and cause
excessive disruption in the lives of U.S. employees and
investors."168
3. Inability to Resolve Disputes
The TMB has frequently failed to reach consensus in adjudi-
cating disputes. 169 The Agreement, however, does not stipulate
what shall happen in such an event. 170 Thus, when disputes
have arisen within the context of trade in textiles and apparel,
the TMB has seldom provided adequate guidance for subsequent
disputes, drawing additional criticism.17 1 In 1995 alone, three
textile matters have been brought to the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body after the TMB failed to resolve the disputes.' 7 2 In
addition, there are many matters which have been pending for
long periods of time and which the TMB has not yet reviewed. 173
This inaction allows nonconforming actions to stand. Some as-
sert that this frustrates the goal of the Agreement, since the
ATC provides for automatic review specifically to avoid the ne-
cessity of a formal challenge. 174 Frequently, the TMB returns a
case to the parties and asks them to reopen negotiations, after
the parties have asked the TMB to make recommendations. 175
This response, one representative of the International Textile
and Clothing Bureau asserts, amounts to bilateral rather than
global administration of the ATC.17 6 For these reasons, advo-
cates argue the TMB ought to be more decisive.
167. Jennings, supra note 33, at 302-03.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 134-139 (outlining 1995 calls).
170. See U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 63 (discussing the absence of specific
directives for the TMB in this context).
171. Somporn Thapanachai, Thailand: Textile Exporters Urge Speedier
Liberalisation, BANGKOK POST, May 25, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library.
172. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 64. Two of these disputes are discussed
throughout this Note. The third dispute involved Indian imports of womens'
and girls' wool coats, and no Dispute Settlement Understanding panel issued a
report on this matter because the United States ultimately rescinded the safe-
guard. As a result, India terminated further action under the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, at n.3.
173. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 64-65.
174. Id. See infra part V. (examining this perception).
175. Thapanachai, supra note 171, at 1.
176. Id.
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V. SOME POSSIBLE RATIONALES AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR CHANGE
Given the DSU panels' findings of severe deficiencies in U.S.
market statements provided to justify use of the transitional
safeguard mechanism, it is necessary to question how the TMB
arrived at its own, substantially different conclusions. There
seem to be at least two possible explanations for the varying con-
clusions from these two separate bodies. First, the TMB deter-
minations may simply be the product of political corruption or
influence from the dominant textile importing countries. An-
other potential rationale, however, is that the two bodies arrived
at drastically distinct conclusions because they are performing
different functions.
If the first explanation is correct, TMB members should fo-
cus on eradicating the political influences in this Body and en-
couraging the Body to be more honest in its review. As
discussed throughout this Note, numerous commentators and
countries have already encouraged these efforts. Theoretically,
at least, Members are more likely to accept adverse rulings if
they perceive the TMB as an impartial and credible body. 177 If
Members feel the TMB is not adjudicating their disputes in an
impartial fashion, they may appeal to the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body more frequently. This involves substantial legal and
administrative costs which adversely affect the efficiency of the
dispute settlement mechanism within the textiles sector.178 Ide-
ally, if TMB decisions were viewed as unbiased and predictable,
not only would the system avoid legal and transactional costs
associated with appeals, but Members could also negotiate more
efficiently. 179
The second explanation posits that the two bodies perform
different functions which may have contributed to the divergent
results. Thus, it may be possible to explain the differing conclu-
sions the TMB and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body panels
have reached by contrasting the approaches these two bodies
use in reviewing and resolving disputes. The rather informal,
conciliatory approach of the TMB is markedly different from the
177. See Jennings, supra note 33, at 308. "Given the TMB's lack of enforce-
ment powers, domestic acceptance is needed to achieve enforcement." Id.
178. Id. at 303-04; see generally Robert Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in THE
NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 135-37 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ed., 1994) (discussing the substantial expenditures of legal
resources associated with the strengthened dispute settlement procedure).
179. Jennings, supra note 33, at 312.
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comparatively legalistic, rigid, formal approach of the WTO
panels. This precise issue was among the central points of con-
tention in the Indian woolen clothing case. The panel report in
this matter addressed this issue in a section of its report entitled
"The Role of the TMB Process Versus the Role of the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism of the DSU [Dispute Settlement
Understanding]."180
The panel thought it was important to distinguish
between the role of panels under the DSU and the role of the TMB
under the ATC as regards safeguard actions... The role of the TMB,
in light of the object and purpose of the ATC, may be understood better
if the application of the ATC is described as providing two tracks: a
TMB track and a DSU track. 181
The panel pointed out that, unlike the DSU panels, the TMB is
not limited to any specific terms of reference.18 2 Additionally,
the panel viewed the functions of the TMB as broad and mul-
tifaceted, as contrasted with the more narrow responsibilities of
a DSU panel.183 The panel asserted that "the TMB process can
replace the consultation phase in the dispute settlement process
under the DSU and is distinct from the formal adjudication pro-
cess by panels. 1 84 In fact, in a recent report, one TMB member
emphasized the TMB's role as a facilitator of ATC implementa-
tion and insisted that the TMB is not a substitute for WTO dis-
pute settlement.18 5
The TMB is not limited, as the DSU panel is, to the initial
information submitted by the importing member because the
parties involved may choose to submit additional information to
the TMB to support their positions, even if the information is
related to subsequent events.186 The panel described the formal
dispute settlement process of the DSU track as the "second
track," in which the DSU panel does not reinvestigate the mar-
ket situation.187 Rather, the DSU limits its consideration to the
evidence the importing member used in developing its own de-
termination to impose the import restraint.18 8 The appellate
body report in the Indian woolen clothing matter dismissed the
panel's comments as "purely a descriptive and gratuitous com-
180. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, paras. 7.18-7.21.
181. Id. para. 7.18.
182. Id. para. 7.19.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. U.S. GAO, supra note 11, at 63, 64.
186. Indian Imports Measure, supra note 53, para. 7.20.
187. Id. para. 7.21.
188. Id.
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ment providing background concerning the Panel's understand-
ing of how the TMB functions.'u8 9 The appellate body did not
consider the Panel's comment to be a "legal finding or conclu-
sion.'190 This issue, however, was one of the primary bases for
appeal in this matter, and it is singificant in attempting to re-
solve the inconsistent conclusions of the TMB and DSU panels.
Examination of the history of textiles dispute resolution
may also be useful in both attempting to understand the opera-
tions of the TMB and reconciling the two bodies' inconsisten-
cies. The TMB was structured in a manner substantially
similar to its predecessor, the TSB. The TSB was frequently re-
garded as "a largely toothless body."191 In fact, barely half of the
MFA participants responded to one TSB request for information
necessary to perform its designated monitoring functions pursu-
ant to the MFA.192 Some MFA signatories never provided any
such information during the entire MFA era, and others re-
mained silent for six to seven years.' 9 3 While the MFA specified
that unresolved legal disputes related to textile trade could be
referred to higher levels in GATT, "action by the Textiles Com-
mittee was in fact expected to be the final step in the process.' 94
The TSB functioned in a more informal and "pseudo-concilia-
tory," rather than a rigorously adjudicatory, fashion. 195 In es-
tablishing the TMB to supervise the new textiles agreement, the
ATC assigned to the TMB duties (and even a name) which are
very similar to those assigned to the TSB under the MFA. 196
There are at least two potentially feasible solutions to the
problems with the dispute settlement process in the textile and
apparel sectors. First, members could negotiate a new dispute
settlement system which would offer them the option to either
bring their dispute to the TMB or, alternatively, proceed imme-
diately to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body if the member be-
189. United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter after Appellate
Body Indian Imports Measure], at V.
190. Id.
191. U.S. -Canada Position Still Far from That of Other Countries in Textile
Talks, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 907 (Jun. 19, 1990).
192. GATT Textile Board Chairman Calls for More Cooperation with WTO
Monitoring, 11 Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Dec. 6, 1994.
193. Id.
194. HUDEC, supra note 58.
195. This statement is based on telephone interviews conducted in Septem-
ber and October of 1997 by the author and Robert Hudec with a United States
Trade Representative official responsible for textile matters.
196. Id.
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lieves the TMB will not do a credible job adjudicating the
matter. This system would likely encourage the TMB to develop
a more rigorous and structured approach in its review of textile
disputes.
It is possible that so long as the opportunity exists to appeal
any unfavorable decision to another, "higher-level" dispute reso-
lution body, unsatisfied member countries will in fact do so.
Based perhaps on the mere co-existence of the broader Dispute
Settlement Body and the ability to "appeal" TMB decisions
before it, the notion that the TMB is a "lower-level WTO panel"
seems to exist. 197 This notion likely contributes to member
countries' unwillingness to accept the TMB decisions which they
do not find fully satisfactory. When an appeal to a DSU panel is
necessary, the appeal involves substantial time and other
costs. 198 Member countries bring many of these panel decisions
to an appellate body, requiring expenditure of additional time
and resources.
Recent disputes discussed herein involving United States
imports of underwear from Costa Rica and woven wool blouses
and shirts from India represent the inability of the TMB to re-
solve disputes.' 9 9 Consequently, textile exporting countries
would like the opportunity to take their disputes directly to the
WTO's dispute settlement system instead of allowing complaints
to lie dormant for months in the TMB.20 0 This would, however,
require modifications to the ATC, since the Agreement specifi-
cally mandates that Members first be unsuccessful in bringing
their dispute to the TMB before invoking the DSU dispute set-
tlement mechanisms. 2 0 1 On the other hand, Norway, the Euro-
pean Union, and Canada disapproved of India's bringing a
textile case before the Dispute Settlement Body after the TMB
197. See WTO Rules Against U.S. on India Quota, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY,
Jan. 8, 1997, at 20 (using the term, "lower-level WTO panel," when referring to
the TMB).
198. Obtaining a decision from a Dispute Settlement Body panel may take
up to 12 months. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
199. See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text (explaining these con-
troversies and the decisions rendered in these matters).
200. Lachica & Bahree, supra note 8.
201. See ATC, supra note 4, art. 8(10).
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had already ruled on the dispute.20 2 They asserted that such
action undermines the credibility of the TMB.2 03
These criticisms necessarily urge consideration of the wis-
dom of establishing a separate and specific dispute settlement
body for a delineated sector of trade. One benefit of a separate
body to adjudicate disputes within the arena of textile and ap-
parel trade is that, presumably, the members of the body are
selected because they possess specific personal expertise in this
area. In continuously adjudicating disputes in this area and
thus continuously applying the same provisions of the same
agreement, members can be expected to become increasingly fa-
miliar with the specific applicable law, thereby developing an in-
stitutional expertise in this area. Additionally, member
countries implementing the ATC can theoretically expect more
consistent decision-making under the ATC, given that the same
group of experts settle the disputes under the Agreement. On
the other hand, the coexistent dispute settlement bodies may
merely encourage appeals upon rendering of a decision unfavor-
able to one of the involved parties. While this appeal process
involves considerable legal resources, an accepted system of ap-
peals exists in many domestic legal systems.
Disputes relating to textile trade are typically quite urgent,
since patterns of trade in this sector are heavily dependent on
current market conditions, fashions, and seasonal changes. 20 4
Thus, with the exception of fundamental and enduring textile
trade policy issues, the more formal, lengthy GATT dispute set-
tlement procedure is less feasible. 205
The other potential solution is to renegotiate the dispute
settlement provisions of the ATC to provide that, once the TMB
has reviewed a textiles dispute, Members could bypass the DSU
panel and directly appeal the matter to an Appellate Body. This
solution is less duplicative, while it retains the personal and in-
stitutional expertise of the TMB in all disputed textile and ap-
parel trade matters under the ATC.
202. WTO to Probe Indian Complaints Against U.S. Textile Safeguards, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 671 (Apr. 24, 1996).
203. See Robert Evans, WTO Sets Panels in India-U.S. Textile Disputes,
REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Apr. 17, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library
("U.S. ambassador Booth Gardner urged India 'to reflect on the wisdom of es-
tablishing a panel in a case where the TMB has issued an unequivocal
finding."').
204. See Zheng, supra note 57, at 343.
205. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Some of the recent criticism levelled against the TMB is in-
deed warranted. The phaseout of the MFA is more likely to be
successful if the TMB is viewed as an impartial, credible, and
transparent body. Generally, the effectiveness and efficiency of
dispute settlement procedures are essential for realizing the
benefits of trade liberalization in any sector. 20 6 While the credi-
bility of the multilateral system of rules governing textile and
apparel trade is contingent on the extent to which its results are
enforceable, it is also clear that there is a lack of transparency in
the U.S. Administration's own application of the ATC, particu-
larly in its process for determining when to impose import re-
straints. As illustrated in recent DSU panel reports on textile
matters and a variety of other reports discussed herein, CITA's
procedures for invocation of the safeguard mechanism of the
ATC are severely flawed. The U.S. Administration's departure
from the requirements of the ATC in this regard and its initial
selection of products for progressive integration may be at least
partially attributed to the sheer political power of the U.S. tex-
tile and apparel industries. Additionally, the more general op-
position of U.S. Congressional members to the objectives of the
WTO and the GATT may also contribute to the Administration's
conduct in textiles and apparel. Another broader dynamic at
play in these disputes, among so many others within the WTO,
is GATT's vulnerability to economically powerful nations in the
international marketplace. 20 7 In the face of such political pres-
sure, the TMB has in recent disputes failed to effectively deny
the United States use of the ATC's safeguard mechanism when
it submitted market statements which were, in the judgment of
DSU panels, grossly inadequate. The TMB's behavior in such
instances may be the result of bias or corruption. Alternatively,
the TMB's conduct could be explained by the substantially dif-
ferent review functions which the TMB and the DSU perform. If
the latter is true, even in part, at least two potential solutions
have been posited and should be considered to improve the effi-
ciency of the dispute settlement process in textile and apparel
trade.
206. Raby, supra note 3, at 17.
207. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 1726 ("Not infrequently, this dy-
namic resulted in manipulation not only of the rules themselves, but also of the
degree to which violations of the rules resulted in sanction.") Id.

